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Forced Heirship in French Law
JOSEPH DAINOW*
The present article is an extended study of the history and
development of forced heirship in the law of France, tracing its
evolution from early forms through codification and from for-
mative influences to recent consequences. Since the private law
of France is frequently taken as a model for discussions of mod-
em civil law, the inquiry includes some examination of the
broader principles involved. This study of forced heirship in
French law is likewise pertinent to other legal systems which
have adopted the institution from France.
In the common law, complete freedom of disposition had been
the rule. It may be interesting to civilians to observe the reasser-
tion of the policy of testamentary restriction in a number of com-
mon law countries.' Most significant of all is the new English
law which came into effect July 1939.2 By throwing further light
on the civil law institution of forced heirship, the present study
may also be of interest to students of the common law who are
observing and participating in these reforms.
FORMATIVE PERIOD
The present French law of forced heirship is not the out-
growth of a single institution. The articles of the Civil Code on
the subject represent a combination of at least four distinct in-
stitutions of the "old French law" (ancien droit frangais). Today,
the right to dispose of one's property is seriously limited if either
ascendant or descendant relatives survive, the extent of the dis-
posable portion varying with the number and quality of the sur-
vivors.
To understand this result, it is necessary to investigate the
elements of the early period of French law. The law of southern
France was in its formative stages thoroughly romanized. Con-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada
(1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1107; and, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in
England (1940) 25 Cornell L. Q. 337.
2. The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938, 1 and 2 Geo. VI, c.
45. See note 1, supra.
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sequently, after the barbarian conquest in the early centuries of
the present era, the legal development in the south was distinct
from that in the north. Although in due course the relatively
small territorial units established their independent laws, each
adhered fairly closely to the general legal pattern and inspiration
of its part of the country. In the south-"country of the written
law" (pays de droit 6crit)-the romanized provincials constituted
such an overwhelming majority of the population as to give that
region a fairly uniform legal aspect, the basic pattern of which
was naturally the Roman law. In the north-"country of the cus-
tomary law" (pays de droit coutumier)-the combinations of
Germanic with Roman and Canon laws as well as with local
usage had occasioned the development of numerous customs pat-
terned mainly on Germanic tradition.' It is impossible to specify
the time when the process of division was finally completed, but
the cleavage was certainly well defined by the middle of the
eleventh century,4 and it was in the north, in the country of the
customs, that the greatest diversity of laws existed.
Country of the Written Law
Opinions differ regarding the continuity of active Roman
influences in the south of France between the sixth and twelfth
centuries. But none disputes the preservation of earlier influences
and an exceedingly active revival after the animated and widely
disseminated renascence of Latin and Roman interests during the
twelfth century. Prior to the barbarian invasion, the country had
been governed by Roman law in the form of the Theodosian Code
(438 A.D.) and the writings of the jurisconsults. The conquerors
permitted this system to continue under their principle of "per-
sonality of laws." In addition, there were also drawn up more
concise statements of the Roman law in effect, such as the
Breviary of Alaric (Lex Romana Visigothorum, 506 A.D.) which
preserved great authority throughout the Middle Ages. 5
Be all this as it, may, in the country of the written law there
existed the institution of the l6gitime in practically the same
form as it had been known to the Romans. Justinian's rules" fix-
3. A General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in Con-
tinental Legal History, 1 Continental Legal History Series (1912) 204.
4. Beautemps-Beaupr6, De La Portion des Biens Disponible et de la
Reduction (1855) 17.
5. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 16-17; Vallier, Le Fonde-
ment du Droit Successoral en Droit Frangais (1902) 101; General Survey, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 5, 17, 19.
6. Novella XVIII (Eighteenth New Constitution, 16 Scott, The Civil Law
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ing an indisposable portion continued in effect; this was one-third
of the estate if the children numbered four or less, and one-half
if the children numbered five or more. Ascendants were entitled
to one-third of their intestate share, but brothers and sisters could
not make any claim unless the testator's bounty had been di-
rected to persons of ill-repute. The original point of departure of
the Roman doctrine had been complete liberty of disposition,
and while this had been curtailed in the presence of surviving
close relatives a trace remained in the testator's formal exercise
of the power of disinheritanceT for certain enumerated causes.
In some respects the legal technique may have been modified
but the results were the same. The querela inofficiosi testamenti,8
properly so-called, may have dropped out of use, but in a case
of preterition, either there was just cause for the disinherison
and the will stood, or the disinherison was unjust and the will
fell; and if a claimant received some benefit less than his lgitime
he was entitled to obtain the supplement.9
The lgitime was received not as a share of the succession
but as a part of the estate. It was therefore not necessary for the
claimant to occupy the position of heir; he merely claimed his
due from the beneficiaries. 0 In keeping with Roman principles,
the estate was regarded as one single unit of property. The fun-
damental idea was the duty of maintenance.
(1932) 95 et seq.); 12 Fenet, Recueli Complet des Travaux Pr~paratoires du
Code Civil (1827) 245.
7. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 126; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 19.
8. The querela inofficlosi testamenti constituted a direct limitation on a
testator's freedom and assured a provision for the children and other mem-
bers of the immediate family despite proper but unjust disinherison in the
will. Without changing the formal jus civile, the introduction of this prae-
torian equity was based on the principle-that a man had a moral duty to-
wards his children and certain close relatives, and if he disinherited them
without cause it was contrary to natural duty and sentiment of affection
(officium pietatis).
The complainant's portion under the querela was fixed at one-quarter of
what he would have received on intestacy. In the case of several claimants
each one's share was very small, and this aspect was therefore improved in
Justinian's reform (supra note 6). This share was called the pars Zegftima,
and the rules governing it constituted a material basis in the development
of the Idgitime of the mediaeval laws and customs, and the forced heirship
of the modern codes. Girard, Manuel Elmentaire de Droit Romain (8 ed.
1929) 913 et seq., 976; Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law (1921) 324 et
seq., 338.
9. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 124, n. 3; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 22-23.
10. This was further confirmed by the Ordinances of 1731 and 1735. Beau-
temps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 22; Brissaud, A History of French
Private Law, 3 Continental Legal History Series (1912) 744.
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The "written law" of Roman origin did not contain any basic
concept of family ownership. Nonetheless, the idea of keeping
property in the family was present in the minds of the people
and found expression in the general testamentary practice of
leaving as much of the estate as possible to the eldest son (with
the charge of seeing to the maintenance and education of the
other children).1
Country of the Customary Law
It was in the northern part of France that the more important
centers of legal as well 'as of general development were estab-
lished, and the influence of the customary law predominated in
the subsequent merging of the two systems in the Civil Code.
But among the different customs, numbering as many as three
hundred and sixty,12 there was considerable variation of detail
due to the local influences of environmental conditions. Never-
theless, in the present field of inquiry, two significant aspects of
the common basic pattern stand out distinctly: (1) the original
Germanic concept of collective (family) ownership, which found
expression in numerous forms of keeping ancestral property in
the family,13 and (2) the carefully observed distinctions as to
the nature and source of property, with logically constructed
rules for the respective combinations. 14
Of the customary institutions which comprise the historical
sources of the present limitations upon a parent's power of
gratuitous disposition, the most obvious and the most important
was the rdserve. This may be defined as the part of a person's
property which the law assured to his heirs, and of which these
h6ritiers rdservataires could not be deprived through donations
made to others.' 5 The amount was usually four-fifths of the an-
cestral property (propres) which had been obtained from within
11. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 103, 129, 137. Cf. 3 Planiol, Traitd
Ei6mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 863, no 3055.
12. Terrat, La Propriet6, Le Code Civil Livre du Centenaire (1904) 329
(360 customs); 1 Planol, Trait6 Elmentaire de Droit Civil (12 ed. 1939) 15,
no 39 (60 "general customs" and about 300 "local customs"). See Dawson, The
Codification of the French Customs (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 765.
13. Huebner, A History of Germanic Private Law, 4 Continental Legal
History Series (1918) 304-312, 395 et seq.; Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 12,
29, 80; 11 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1919) 6, § 678; 6
Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (1934) 168, no 121.
14. Colin, Le Droit de Succession, Le Code Civil Livre du Centenaire
(1904) 307.
15. 3 Plantol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 860, no 3047, 863, no 3055.
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the family. And if there were no children or descendants, the
basic idea of keeping such property in the family was carried to
the logical conclusion of making the claim available only to those
heirs in the line whence the particular property had come."0
As distinguished from ancestral property, there was the ac-
quired property (acquits) obtained by a person through his own
efforts or from some source outside of the family.17 And in addi-
tion to these two kinds of property, both of which referred only
to immovables, there was also the movable property; but the
transcendant importance of immovable property obscured the
interest in movables and very little legal attention was devoted
to the latter. Thus, as distinguished from the indisposable part,
there was the disposable portion (quotit6 disponible) over which
a person had absolute freedom. This part consisted of the remain-
ing one-fifth of the ancestral property, all of the acquired prop-
erty, and all of the movables. 1
Although the rdserve constituted a forced intestate succes-
sion of a part of the estate, so as to insure its remaining in the
family, 9 there was not always a substantial amount of (or any)
ancestral property. To meet this kind of situation, a modification
was introduced that in default of ancestral property there should
be substituted in its stead either the acquired property or, in
default of both, the movable property. Neither of the latter kinds
of property took on the character of the former by this so-called
"subrogation"; there was merely impressed on it the restriction
of indisposability. 20 While this was only a palliative it was really
a significant departure from the basic idea of family interest and
bears a much greater resemblance to the Roman principle of
maintenance. However, since it functioned poorly and was not
extensively applied it was regarded with keen disapproval.
On the other hand, it was relatively simple for the Roman
lgitime from the country of the written law to diffuse more gen-
16. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 82; 11 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 6, § 678; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 59; 8 Pothier,
Oeuvres (ed. Bugnet, 1861) 275, no 188 (Trait des Donations Testamentaires,
c. IV, art. II, § IV).
17. Brissaud, op. cit. supra note 10, at 273.
18. 8 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 16, at 272, nos 178 et seq. (Trait6 des
Donations Testamentaires, c. IV, art. II).
19. This retention of property in the family answered so well to the spirit
of the landed aristocracy that the rdserve has even been regarded as an
institution of feudal law. See 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 172, no 124.
20. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 85, 86, n. 1.
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erally into and become adapted to the customs of the north. It
took some time for this so-called l6gitime de droit to be intro-
duced into the customary law, but attempts to foster the idea
of a moral duty to provide for the maintenance of children began
as early as the thirteenth century.2 ' The policy spread very
widely, and most customs established this claim for sustenance
in favor of children only; some customs extended it to ascendants.
In the early stages it was not fixed at any particular amount but
for reasons of expediency it usually became established as one-
half of the intestate share.2 Following the Roman tradition it
was a personal claim and not a share in the succession. To co-
ordinate with other institutions of the customary law, this lgi-
time de droit could only be claimed either when the r~serve was
an empty right, or as a cumulation when the latter was inade-
quate. In order to be effective it retained the Roman character
of affecting all property regardless of nature or source.2i
In some customs there also developed the l6gitime coutu-
mitre. This combined the application of the rdserve to ancestral
property (to the extent of one-half of all such property) with the
effectiveness of the lgitime de droit against donations inter vivos
as well as those mortis causa, and extended the right to all lineal
heirs (like the rdserve) .24
The lgitime coutumi&e was not widely adopted, and was
displaced completely when the lgitime de droit took on the char-
acter (from the r6serve) of requiring the quality of heir in a
claimant. This final combination is usually the only one referred
to as the lgitime of the customary law and it functioned as a
supplement to the rdserve.
In view of the Germanic customary origin of the reserve, of
restraints upon alienation and other manifestations of collective
ownership, the development of individual rights of disposition
21. Engelman, Testaments Coutumiers (1903) 258-9; Brissaud, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 741.
22. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 87-88; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 53; 8 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 16, at 420, no 212 (Trait6
des Donations entre vifs, sec. III, art. V).
23. 11 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 13, at 6-9, § 678; Beautemps-
Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60.
24. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 16, at 418 (Introduction to Title XVI,
Custom of Orleans, "des Testaments, et Donations Testamentaires," sec. IV,
§ 2, no 53); 8 id. at 275-276, nos 188, 189 (Trait6 des Donations Testamentaires,
c. IV, art. II, § IV); 8 id. at 431, no 245 (Traitd des Donations entre vifs, sec.
III, art. VI); Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 65; 11 Aubry et
Rau, op. cit. supra note 13, at 9, § 678.
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could only have been by way of encroaching exception or partial
victory of the individual interest over that of the family.25 A
comparison of the customary rdserve and the Roman lgitime
may show a great prima facie resemblance, but though their re-
sults were in some aspects the same their respective develop-
ments started at opposite extremes and approached a common
ground by evolving in a converging direction. Nothwithstanding
the differences between the laws of the north and of the south,
the social and economic needs were very much the same all over
the country and variations in legal technicalities could not pre-
vent the same results.26
In the formative elements of the customary law, one very
significant aspect of the general pattern seems to be a decrease
in the original emphasis on the interest of the family in order
to make a more important place for the interest of the individual.
During the revolutionary period, the interests of the state take
first rank; and in the codification, all three interests combine in
a sort of compromise.
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD AND PREPARATION OF THE CIVIL CODE
The general principles of the French Revolution found ex-
pression in every phase of the life of the people and of the de-
velopment of their institutions. But while political liberty and
individual equality were among the major objectives of the revo-
lution against the old r6gime, the all-devouring interest of the
state took exclusive precedence wherever possible.
The legal scheme of successions was regarded as one of the
most important branches of private law. And the right of owner-
ship, being the creation of society, was to be exercised only within
the limits of the interests of the state (which represents so-
ciety) .27 Thus, while equality of inheritance was established by
the abolition of all feudal privileges and other preferences, it
was in the interest of the state that the individual's liberty of
disposition (inter vivos or mortis causa) was curtailed more than
ever before. Testation had to be regulated in the general social
interest. Forced parcellation of property would break up and
prevent the concentration of large landed estates; it would also
encourage an increase in population and favor the coming gener-
ation with this protection against parents of the older tradition.
25. Cf. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 72-79.
26. Id. at 136-137. Cf. 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 170, no 122.
27. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 192-193.
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Such a maximum distribution of property would be a necessary
measure for the development of the public wealth (the state).2
Legislation
In this spirit there were passed a number of laws dealing
with the general subject of the present inquiry. One of the first
decrees29 abolished the feudal r~gime;3 0 two others 1 abrogated all
the privileges and preferences of inheritance. An early law3 2 did
away with substitutions. The old distinctions as to the nature
and origin of property were likewise eliminated, leaving the es-
tate as one single unit 3 And when it was discovered that all
these efforts to establish equality could be upset by gifts and
legacies, a law"' was passed removing all power of disposition
in the direct line."5 These laws were obviously the expressions of
nervous reaction still at the heat of excitement, but there were
also two more carefully considered legislative measures.
The law of 17 nivose, year II (January 6, 1794)36 came about
as a result of the discussion on successions in Cambac6rs' first
unsuccessful project for a complete civil code. This law was not
quite so radical; it provided that a person could dispose of one-
tenth of his estate if he left heirs in the direct line, and of one-
sixth if there were only collaterals. This disposable portion could
be given only to strangers, so as not to disturb the equality be-
tween the heirs.
After six years of further unhappy results, 87 a more reasonable
compromise was made between the interests -of the property-
owner and the other members of his family. The law of 4 ger-
28. Id. at 195, 201, 204, 206-7; Brissaud, op. cit. supra note 10, at 746; 3
Colin et Capitant, Cours Elmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais (8 ed. 1936) 755,
no 928; 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 864, no 3056; Terrat, supra note
12, at 330.
29. Decree, August 4, 1789; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at
67.
30. If the rdserve is considered as part of the feudal system (see supra
note 19) it was hereby abolished. 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 174,
no 126.
31. Decrees, March 15, 1790, April 8, 1791; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 67.
32. Law, August 25, 1792; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 69.
33. Colin, supra note 14, at 301.
34. Law, March 7, 1793; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at
69-70; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 756, no 928.
35. Allegedly introduced by a member of the Assembly who found himself
thus excluded. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 69.
36. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 72; 3 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 756, no 928.
37. 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 864, no 3056.
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minal, year VIII (March 25, 1800) 38 graded the disposable portion
so that it was one-fourth if three or fewer children survived, one-
fifth if four children, one-sixth if five children, and so on.
Both of these laws merely fixed the limits of the disposable
portion, so that the remainder constituted a forced intestate suc-
cession. Consequently, it was necessary for the claimant to have
and to exercise the quality of heir.89
In accordance with the general principles of the revolution-
ary spirit, all the enactments provided an extremely large com-
pulsory portion for children. But these reactions started with
excessive extremes 0 and had to be tempered down consistently
to a more 'suitable equilibrium."1
Unsuccessful Attempts at Codification
The French Civil Code has justly been hailed as one of the
most outstanding legal achievements of recent centuries, but the
idea of a unified and uniform body of law for the whole of France
was very old. Some of the inspirations-dating back to the time
of Louis XI-advanced no further than the thought, and the
strong local traditions of a surviving legal independence pre-
vented any complete realization of such a project; nevertheless,
the partial progress made by a number of attempts paved the
way for ultimate codification.2
Plans for a general code were included in the proposed work
of all the national political assemblies after the revolution, and a
number of complete projects were actually presented.48 The first
38. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81; 3 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 757, no 928.
39. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 82-83.
40. Cf. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 185.
41. Cf. Garrigou, De l'Influence du R~gime Successoral Frangais sur
i'Etat de la Proprit4 Foncibre (1911) 38; Colin, supra note 14, at 298.
42. Louis XI's idea (in about 1480) of unifying all the customs; Dumou-
lin's recommendation of a uniform code (c. 1560); States General's votes
(1560, 1576, 1614) to compile one; Brisson's work (1603); Colbert's Great Ordi-
nances (1667-1681) under Louis XIV; Lamoignon's incomplete and unofficial
work (1672); D'Aguesseau's Ordinances (1731-1747). 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 22 et seq., nos 54 et seq., translated in General Survey, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 279.
43. The Constituent Assembly voted (October 5, 1790) that a general code
be made; the Constitution of 1791 contained the promise; only inchoate steps
were taken by the Legislative Assembly (1791); four complete projects were
presented to the Convention, the Directory and the Consulate (1793-1799).
1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 25 et seq., nos 64 et seq., translated in Gen-
eral Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 280.
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of these projects for a civil code 4 was drawn up by a legislative
committee of the Convention and presented by Cambac6r~s on
August 9, 1793. An excessively brief work of 695 articles, it was
really inadequate; and although of a very revolutionary spirit it
did not satisfy the assembly. However, its proposed regulations
for the limitation of testamentary disposition were enacted in the
law of 17 nivose (supra).
In a second project 5 of only 297 articles presented by Cam-
bac6r~s on 23 fructidor, year II (September 9, 1794) the same
rules for the transmission of property were repeated, because
they were considered a just balance between the interests in-
volved-right of ownership, bonds of blood, political laws, division
of property, public prosperity. This project was sent back to the
committee for revision and thus led to the next one.
The third project 46 came under the Directory, and was pre-
sented by Cambac~r~s to the Council of Five Hundred in the
month of messidor, year IV (1795). The disposable portion to the
prejudice of direct heirs was retained as one-tenth of the estate
(as in preceding projects); but to the prejudice of collaterals it
was increased, on the theory that where the family relationship
was weaker the liberty of disposition should increase, so that a
person could dispose inter vivos of one-half of his estate, and
mortis causa of one-third. However, partisan dissension in the
assemblies prevented any progress of. the project, and like its
predecessors it fell by the wayside.
Just as the Consulate was coming into existence, a fourth
project"7 was presented to the Council of Five Hundred by Jac-
queminot on 30 frimaire, year VIII (December 21, 1799). The
disposable portion was now further increased so that a person
could dispose of one-fourth of his estate if he left any descendants,
one-third if ascendants, brothers or sisters, and one-half if uncles
or cousins. But this project came at a bad time and made no
headway at all.
44. 1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1, 8, 51 (arts. 24, 26); Beautemps-
Beauprd, op. cit. supra note 4, at 86; 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 27, no
70, translated in General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 280.
45. 1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 99, 106-107, 119 (art. 96); Beautemps-
Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 87; 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 28, no
71, translated In General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 280.
46. 1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 140, 166, 259 (arts. 542, 543); Beau-
temps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4, at 87; 1 Plantol, op. cit. supra note 12, at
28, no 74, translated in General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 280.
47. 1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 327, 370 (art. 16); Beautemps-Beaupr6,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 88.
[Vol. II
1940] FORCED HEIRSHIP IN FRENCH LAW 679
Napoleon's Undertaking
Despite these set-backs, the desire and the need for a general
code of private law were becoming more and more urgent. The
obstacles to its accomplishment were hitherto impassable; it re-
quired the energy and the strategy of a strong personality48 to
bring about the long-awaited Civil Code.49
The law (or title) which included the subject under survey
was captioned "Of Gifts inter vivos and of Wills," and it is strik-
ing that in all the discussion not a single opinion was expressed
against the limitation of a parent's power of disposition. There
was some difference of opinion as to its extent, and there was
overwhelming opposition against limitation in favor of collaterals.
But the assurance of provision for children was axiomatic.
In the preliminary speech introducing the whole project be-
fore the Council of State, Portalis explained the basic principles
that a man's rights of ownership came to an end with his death,
and that the intervention of the state in matters of inheritance
48. Napoleon's part in the framing and in the final realization of the Civil
Code has been a disputed subject. His role was certainly not a nominal one
like that of Justinian; he presided over and took part in about one hundred
sessions of the Council of State. His minor coup d'etat to obviate the un-
friendly interference of the Tribunate must in itself rank him as a very active
participant. See 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 35, no 91, 30, no 80, trans-
lated in General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281; Lobingier, Napoleon and
his Code (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 114, 123-126.
49. In, appointing a commission to draft a new project, Napoleon chose
two men from the country of the customs and two from the country of the
written law, taking one member from the bench and one from the bar In each
case. These persons were all past middle age, but Napoleon wanted jurists
well versed in the old law to construct a basic framework which could be re-
modelled in the course of legislative process so as to fit existing conditions.
Tronchet was president of the Court of Cassation; Bigot-Pr6ameneu was gov-
ernment commissioner at the Court of Cassation; Portalis was government
commissioner at the Prize Court; Malleville was a judge of the Court of Cas-
sation. 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 28, no 75, translated in General Sur-
vey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281; Lobingier, supra note 48, at 117-118, 122-123.
The commission came into being on 24 thermidor, year VIII (August 13,
1800), and in accordance with instructions a project was reported in four
months. Three months were then allowed for the comment and criticism of
the judiciary of the country. For the "observations" of the Court of Cassation
and of all the Courts of Appeal, see Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, vols. 2, 3, 4, 5.
The legislative machinery through which any measure had to be piloted
was extremely complicated. General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281-282;
1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, lxiv et seq.; Tucker, Legislative Procedure in
the Adoption of the Code Napoleon (1935) 1 Rep. State Bar of Louisiana 26.
The whole project was divided into a number of separate laws or titles, and
each of these was dealt with as an independent unit. But one of the legisla-
tive bodies contained so many elements strongly opposed to Napoleon that as
soon as they manifested this hostile attitude towards the first two parts of
the project, Napoleon withdrew the whole matter from further consideration
and reorganized that body (Tribunate) so that, together with a new mode of
procedure, the danger of obstruction was eliminated.
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and testation was indispensable because the interests involved
were much broader than those of the individuals concerned. A
limited leeway for disposition should be established to retain
some sanction of parental authority and to make possible worthy
benefactions. In conclusion he clearly emphasized that the ulti-
mate objective of all civil institutions-even a good family spirit
encourages good citizenship-was the interest of the state.A0
Following these principles, the Project of the Year VIII1 pro-
posed that donations, inter vivos or mortis causa, should not ex-
ceed one-fourth of a man's estate if he left surviving children or
descendants, one-half if ascendants, brothers or sisters, and three-
fourths if only nephews or nieces. In the absence of all these
classes, there should be no limitation.
After passing through the committee on legislation of the
Council of State, the proposed title was formally reported to this
assembly by Bigot-Pr~ameneu.52 Such a law, he stated, was not
really in contravention of a parent's wish but rather in conform-
ity with his presumed affections. After giving children their
natural existence it was not only the duty as a parent but also
as a citizen, to the children and to society, not to abuse any powers
of ownership and to assure the children a proper civil existence.
Unfortunately, long experience had shown the weaknesses of
human nature, and to eliminate such possibilities it was indis-
pensable to the social order that formal limitations, -effective
against dispositions inter vivos and by will, should express the
most desirable balance between a person's right of ownership and
his parental duty.
The article proposed"3 now presented a completely new
aspect: instead of placing limits on the power of disposition, it
created a positive 16gitime in favor of certain persons, consisting
of a fraction of what would have been their share on intestacy.
This fraction was three-fourths for descendants, one-half for
ascendants, and one-fourth for brothers and sisters-the second
and third groups taking only in default of the preceding ones.
Why this change was made, does not appear; but before the
proposed form had been in discussion long it was changed back
50. 1 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 463, 518, 520, 521, 522.
51. Projet de Code Civil (Projet de rAn VIII) (1801) book III, tit. IX, art.
16; 2 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at 3, 276.
52. Session of 30 nivose, year XI (January 20, 1803); 12 Fenet, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 244 et seq.
53. Id. at 254.
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to the previous form, with the added innovation of graduating
the disposable portion according to the number of surviving
children.
The discussion in the Council of State54 was varied. One
view 5 5 maintained that the disposable portion should be very
small because testation was merely a benefit bestowed by the
civil and not the natural law. This was balanced by another
opinion5" that the latitude should be greater because penalty and
recompense are great stimuli of human activity and that testa-
tion could serve further uses for society in leveling off inequali-
ties from other causes. The chairman proposed 7 that the parent's
limitation should be graduated between one-half and three-
fourths in accordance with the number of surviving children.
This was acceptable to all and the amendment was adopted 58 by
the Council of State. When the article was redrafted, along the
original lines of limiting the parent's disposition,59 it appeared in
the form which carried right through into the official Code: if a
parent left one child he could dispose of one-half of his estate, if
two children one-third, and if three or more children one-fourth.
The next step was the unofficial communication6 0 to the legis-
lative section of the Tribunate. The result of this conference l
between the committees of the two assemblies were reported
back to the Council of State,6 2 and while the observations of the
members of the Tribunate regarding the drafting were not
followed, their adamant opposition against limitations for the
benefit of collaterals was heeded and this was completely re-
moved in the definitive redaction of the title.65 The Council of
State accepted the criticism of the Tribunate that the interest of
a collateral was not sufficient cause to justify interference with
54. Id. at 254 et seq., 299 et seq.
55. Id. at 257, 300 (Tronchet).
56. Id. at 254, 307 (Malleville); id. at 258, 311 (Portalis further added that
there were more ungrateful children than unjust parents). These were the
two representatives from the country of the written law.
57. Id. at 260, 300 (Second Consul Cambacr s).
58. Id. at 319.
59. Art. 21: "Les libdralitds, soit par actes entre-vifs, soit par testament,
ne pourront exc~der la moitid des biens du disposant, s"il ne laisse d son ddc4s
qu'un enfant; le tiers, s"iZ laisse deux enfants; le quart, s'il en laisse un plus
grand nombre." Id. at 419.
60. Id. at 439.
61. Id. at 440 et seq.
62. Id. at 469 et seq.
63. Id. at 473 et seq.
19401
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the right of disposition, and that the absence of limitation would
even bring collaterals into a closer dependence upon each other .
4
Representatives from these two assemblies still had to take
the measure before a third assembly which actually did the
voting. In the name of the Council of State, Bigot-Pr~ameneu
presented the exposd des motifs to the Legislative Body. 5 In
explaining this part of the title, he emphasized the importance
of the rules regarding disposition as an influence on the customs
of the people and on the happiness of the family. Between the
extreme power of disposition and its complete elimination in
favor of the family, a middle path had been chosen so as to give
parents as much leeway as was compatible with the children's
retention of their status.
Since the differences between the Council of State and the
Tribunate had been straightened out long in advance, the official
communication to the Tribunate66 was a matter of form only.
The speeches 67 on this part of the title expressed complete accord
with the compromise that had been reached as the conciliation
between the rights of parents, the interests of children, and the
general welfare of the state.
The last step was the official reply by the Tribunate in the
speech of its representative before the Legislative Body68 for
whom there was simply left the vote6 1 of adoption.
7 0
POST-CODIFICATION PERIOD
The basic limitations of gratuitous disposition are embodied
in the Civil Code7' as follows:
64. Id. at 444-445, 470.
65. Id. at 508 et seq.
66. Id. at 575.
67. Id. at 575 et seq. (Jaubert); id. at 623 et seq. (Sedillez).
68. Id. at 627 (Favard).
69. Session of 23 flor~al, year XI (May 13, 1803). Id. at 647.
70. In this manner, each of the separate laws (or titles) was manoeuvred
through' the legislative process until all of them had been passed. Then the
combined laws (36) forming the entire Code received final passage as a single
unit which was promulgated on 30 ventose, year XII (March 21, 1804) as the
"Civil Code of the French." After four successive changes of name, to and
from the name of "Code Napoleon," the Code has since 1870 been referred to
simply as the "Civil Code." March 21, 1804-Code civil des Franqais; Septem-
ber 9, 1807-Code Napoleon; Charters 1814, 1830-Code civil des Frangais;
March 27, 1852-Code Napoleon; since 1870-Code civil (leaving the name
Code Napoleon to designate the original form). 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
12, at 32, no 85, translated in General Survey, op. cit. supra note 3, at 285; 1
Fenet, op. cit. supra note 6, at lxxx et seq., cxviii et seq.
71. Art. 913, French Civil Code: "Les lib~ralitds, soit par actes entre vilfs,
soit par testament, ne pourront excdder la moitid des biens du disposant, s'll
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Art. 913. "Gratuitous dispositions, whether by deed inter
vivos or by will, may not exceed one-half of the property of
the donor, if he leaves at his death only one legitimate child;
one-third, if he leaves two children; one-fourth, if he leaves
three or a greater number.. .
Art. 914. "Gratuitous dispositions whether by deed inter
vivos or by will may not exceed one-half of the property, if,
in default of children, the decedent leaves one or more ascend-
ants in each of the paternal and maternal lines, and three-
fourths if he leaves ascendants in one line only...."
In the interpretation and application of these and related pro-
visions of the Code, there were no serious differences of opinion
among the jurists and commentators because the general ideas
had been clearly expressed in the legislative debates. The ques-
tions72 that did arise were concerned with (a) the exact historical
origin of the institution which the Code had consecrated, and (b)
problems in the actual application of the principle to individual
cases.
ne laisse d son ddc s qt'un enfant Idgitime; Ie tiers, s'il laisse deux enfants;
le quart, s'Al en laisse trots ou un plus grand nombre.
"L'enfant naturel Idgalement reconnu a droit d une reserve. Cette rdserve
est une quotit6 de celle qu'il aurait eue slit eift dtd lugitime, calculde en ob-
servant la proportionqui existe entre la portion attribuee 'enfant naturel
au cas de succession ab intestat et celle qu'il aurait eue dans le meme cas s'il
e~at dtd Idgitime.
"Sont compris dans le present article, sous le nom d'enfants, les descen-
dants en quelque degrd que ce soit. Ndanmoins, uts ne sont comptds que pour
V'enfant qu'ils reprosentent dans la succession du disposant."
Art. 914, French Civil Code: "Les libdralitds, par actes entre vifs ou par
testament, ne pourront excdder la moitid des biens, st, 4 ddfaut d'enfant, Ze dd-
funt laisse un ou plusleurs ascendants dans chacune des lignes paternelle et
maternelle, et les trois quarts, s'il ne laisse d'ascendants que dans une ligne.
"Les biens ainsi rdserv6s au profit des ascendants seront par eux recuetl-
Us dans P'ordre oll Za lot les appelle d succ~der; is auront seuls droit d cette
rdserve, dans tous les cas oft un partage en concurrence avec des collatdraux
ne leur donnerait pas la quotitd de biens d laquelle elle est fixde."
Art. 915, French Civil Code: "Lorsque, d ddfaut d'enfants Zdgitimes, to
ddfunt laisse 4 la fois un ou plusieurs enfants naturels et des ascendants dans
les deux lignes on dans une seule, les libdralits par actes entre vifs et par
testament ne pourront excdder Za moitid des biens du disposant sl n'y a
qu'un enfant naturel, le tiers s'il y en a deux, Ie quart iZ y en a trots ou un
plus grand nombre. Les biens ainsi rdservds seront recueillis par les ascen-
dants jusqu'4 concurrence d'un huiti~me de la succession, et Ze surplus par les
enfants naturels."
The present discussion excludes consideration of illegitimate children;
suffice it to say that their rights have been very substantially improved and
increased by the law of March 25, 1896, which amended these articles.
72. Since the present discussion can only inquire into fundamental rules
and principles, it is impossible to do more than indicate the general nature
and substance of some of these issues.
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. (a) The system adopted by the Civil Code to restrict the
power of disposition resembled certain aspects of both the rdserve
and the lgitime of the old law. It is striking that the latter name
does not appear in any of the final code articles78 despite its fre-
quent occurrence in the debates, and although the former is found
a few times7' the two have subsequently been used interchange-
ably. The textual use of the word rdserve and the predominant
influence of the customary law in the codification might be mag-
nified into the argument that the old rdserve was the basic source
of the new one.7 5 At the same time, the retention of important
functions of the old lgitime argues equally well for the other
contention 0 despite the loss of the name.
The institution under the Civil Code resembles the old rdserve
in that it constitutes a share of the succession and can only be
obtained in the quality of heir. It resembles the old lgitime in
that (1) it is granted only to relatives in the direct line, (2) it
is effective against donations inter vivos as well as those mortis
causa, and (3) it affects all property without distinction as to
nature or source. And differing from both of the older institu-
tions, forced heirship under the Code permits a different dispos-
able portion and provides for a variation of the fraction according
to the number of surviving children. 7
The fact remains that the Code took much from both of the
basic institutions of the old law, and the combination had a new
identity of its own. From the legislation of the revolutionary
period and from the debates in the preparation of the Code, it
is manifest that the disappearance of the distinctions as to nature
and source of property was linked up with a general departure
from the concept of retaining property in the family. Forced par-
cellation of property was closely associated with the political
issues of the period, and the exclusion of a compulsory provision
73. 12 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1893) 14, no 8.
74. Used originally in the project as a verb only, then as a noun in refer-
ence to collaterals, and when the provisions for the latter were dropped, the
use of the word as a noun in other texts remained. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 97.
75. E.g., Beautemps-Beauprd, op. cit. supra note 4, at 98.
76. E.g., "the Zdgitime under the name of rdserve." 12 Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 73, at 14, no 8. The Civil Code kept the name of the institution it
suppressed, and suppressed the name of the institution it kept. Vallier, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 297.
77. Cf. Levasseur, Portion Disponible (1805) 3 et seq.; 11 Aubry et Rau,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 10 et seq., § 679; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 757 et seq., no 929; 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 864, no 3057;
6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 175 et seq., no 127.
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for collaterals was the last gasp of the family ownership concept
in submission to the complete emergence of the individual right.
That this right should be limited in favor of children and parents
was the only possible solution for the coexistence of conflicting
rights.7 8 If anything, it was the old idea of officium pietatis sup-
planting the retention of property in the family.
7 9
The power of disinheritance was removed under the Civil
Code,8 0 but a child was excluded from the rdserve if he was "un-
worthy" of inheriting and thereby deprived of the quality of
heir."1 Indirect methods of defeating the compulsory portion by
means of purchasing life insurance annuities, and so forth, have
been frowned upon and are not common.
2
Thus, while there never was any question about limiting the
power of disposition, and while the early institutions of the for-
mative period were distinctly manifest in the modem reserve
under the Code, there was no exclusive relation to any one of
them. The result was the combination of desirable functions from
all of them adapted to the new political and economic conditions.
(b) The problems which arose in the application of the prin-
ciple are exemplified in the following illustration: when a man
dies leaving three children, and two of them renounce, is the one
who accepts entitled to one-half or three-fourths of the estate?
If those renouncing are excluded from the count, he would be
78. The eternal mission of positive law. 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 187. See also Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 297; 5 Toullier, Le Droit Civil
Frangais (5 ed. 1830) 107.
79. There is a duty to close relatives, and no longer a sort of family de-
posit. 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 180, no 127; 3 Colin et Capitant, op.
cit. supra note 28, at 758, no 929; Brissaud, op. cit. supra note 10, at 748. This
must be distinguished from the alimentary obligation during lifetime, because
the rdserve is obtained by the rich as well as the poor-the duty is thus based
on relationship rather than purely on need. Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at
299. But see 3 Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Frangais (1930) 856, that
the rdserve is the transformed continuation of the alimentary obligation. 2 De-
molombe, Trait6 des Donations Entre Vife et des Testaments (4 ed. 1872) 5,
adds a reason for the rdserve in the interest of the state to avoid the burden
of such needy persons.
80. Compare the rationalization that in the presence of the strong bond
of relationship such an expression of mind must have been Incomplete, and
the law retains what is good and reasonable by disengaging the proper mani-
festation of will from the harmful passions. It is not the declared Intention
but the presumed intention which must govern. Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 99-100.
81. The causes of unworthiness are enumerated in Art. 727, French Civil
Code. See 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 391, no 1731; 3 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 758, no 929; Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 304.
82. 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 862, no 3052; Amos and Walton,
Introduction to French Law (1935) 339.
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entitled to one-half, as an only child; if they are to be counted
in determining the indisposable portion which is to be divided
amongst those who accept, he would get three-fourths':-
The latter procedure seems unreasonable but it is the one
which has been generally accepted because the language" of the
Code fixes one-fourth as the limit of the disposable portion "if
he leaves at his death . . . three or a greater number. '83 The
preliminary issue of requiring the quality of heir having been
resolved in the affirmative, and the indisposable portion consti-
tuting a forced intestacy, 4 the conclusion follows that one accept-
ing child receives the whole rdserve (three-fourths of the estate)
for the calculation of which the two others had also been counted.
The reduction8 5 of excessive donations cannot be determined
until the opening of the succession and the formation of a fictiti-
ous estate including the assets gratuitously disposed of during
lifetime. After the deduction of debts and the calculation of the
disposable portion, ,the excessive legacies are simply cut down
proportionately or eliminated altogether. But as to gifts inter
vivos the matter is much more complicated. Such gifts are not
affected until all the legacies have been exhausted, and then only
in the order of the more recent before the more remote. Since
the theory of reduction is the resolution of the donee's right, the
latter will be deemed never to have owned that part, 6 and con-
sequently all rights conveyed by him must suffer the same pre-
carious status.
Although in principle the forced heir can demand reduction
in kind without distinction as to movables or immovables, 7 his
recourse to recover a movable object from a subsequent acquirer
83. Levasseur, op. cit. supra note 77, at 25; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 115-116; 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 866, no 3061;
Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6, Des Donations entre-vifs et des Testaments,
Vol. II (1872) 171 et seq., no 784; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 78, at 115.
84. Since the Code fixes the limits of the portion which is disposable, the
balance is indisposable and necessarily constitutes a forced intestacy. Levas-
seur, op. cit. supra note 77, at 28; Beautemps-Beaupr6, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 101 et seq.; 12 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 73, at 18, no 10, 22 et seq., no
13; 3 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 11, at 874, no 3078; 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 176, no 127; Vallier, op. cit. supra note 5, at 303-304.
85. Arts. 920-930, French Civil Code.
86. 5 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1933) 108,
no 113, 110, no 115; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 801, no 973; 6
Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 256, no 189. However, the donee is permitted
to retain the fruits derived up to the time of the donor's death. Art. 928,
French Civil Code.
87. 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 86, at 109, no 114; 3 Colin et
Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 802, no 975.
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is practically cut off by the codal provision that possession of
movable property is equivalent to title.8 To recover immovable
property,- recourse against third persons is specifically made avail-
able88 as long as prescription has not run. 0 But the action for
reduction is essentially against the donee,"1 and if he is solvent
the heir may be obliged to accept a payment in money 9 2 without
recourse against property which has passed to a third person."
Social and Economic Consequences
Many comments and criticisms have been made regarding
the effects, or alleged effects, produced by forced heirship. Men-
tion is here made of some of these observations in relation to:
property matters, the interests of the family, the question of pop-
ulation, and proposed reforms.
(a) Property (land). The first necessary and obvious result
caused by the rdserve in combination with the basic principle of
equality in successions was the forced parcellation of land. This
widening distribution of wealth was one of the important objec-
tives of the revolutionary spirit. The fact of extensive parcella-
tion is very manifest, but to its operation all sorts of consequences
have been attributed.
The arguments of the opponents" of the system center around
two main ideas: primarily, the continual splitting of property
seriously decreases agricultural exploitation by precluding large
scale methods while the property is still productive enough for
such work; and secondly, the ultimate result of carrying this
process to its logical conclusion is that the resultant little bits of
land are not productive enough for any kind of work.
88. Art. 2279, French Civil Code. 6 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 256,
no 189.
89. Art. 930, French Civil Code.
90. Extinctive prescription of 30 years from the opening of the succes-
sion, or acquisitive prescription of 10 or 20 years by a possessor in good faith
with just title. 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 86, at 123-124, nos 127,
128.
91. 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 86, at 115, no 119.
92. Id. at 109, no 114, 115, no 119; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note
28, at 802, no 975.
93. The only possibility of prejudice is to the third person who has ac-
quired immovable property from a donee who is insolvent when sued for
the reduction.
94. E.g., Le Play and his School. See in Garrigou, op. cit. supra note
41, at 31 et seq., 82, 98; 5 Roguin, Trait6 de Droit Civil Compar--Les Suc-
cessions (1912) 661; Coulon, De La Libert4 de Tester: Motifs et Projet de Loi
(1899) 38 et seq.
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In reply, the proponents" assert that (1) there is no proof
of excessive parcellation nor of any harmful effects, (2) on the
contrary, the cultivation of the land and the condition of the
people have improved, and (3) the system of small properties
predominates by reason of its own virtue. There is really no
continual and irresistible pulverization of land, because natural
and economic forces keep this process within the limits of pro-
ductivity by either preventive or corrective methods. 6 These
counteracting forces are manifest in sales, exchanges, settlements,
partnerships, marriages, incorporations, credit asociations, and so
forth.
(b) Family. It has been contended" that this part of the
succession laws ruins all family discipline, and discourages initia-
tive and ambition. The children know that they can not be de-
prived of their portion and the paternal authority is destroyed.
Then, each one gets-so little that his attempt to live on the land
is not only futile but also harmful to his welfare. Finally, the
petty quarrels of spite and jealousy between children need no
elaboration.
Needless to say, these contentions are refuted by the opposite
conclusions which find favorable results from the same causes. 8
While it is conceded that the family is more mobile, less stable
and less rigidly constituted as a result of enforced partition, the
weakened parental authority has been supplemented by more
kindness and affection. Furthermore, the rule of equality has re-
moved the great cause of jealousy so that the family as a unit has
concentrated. The principle of equality is so essentially a part
of the notion of justice that there can be no question about ac-
cepting the corollary of enforced partition.
(c) Population. Partly related to the preceding issue but
sufficiently distinct to be indicated separately, are the alleged
effects of these succession laws in seriously reducing the birth-
95. E.g., Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 82 et seq., 97; Bonnal, La
Libert6 de Tester et la Divisibilit6 de la Propri6t6 (1866) 327 et seq.
96. Garrigou, op. cit. supra, note 41, at 86, 94; Boissonade, Histoire de la
R6serve Hdr~ditaire (1873) 654 et seq.; Charmont, Changes of Principle in
the field of Family, Inheritance, and Persons, 11 Continental Legal History
Series (1918) 147, 158 et seq.; Voirin, La Famille et l'Heritage, Le Maintien
et la Defense de la Famille par le Droit, Lecture No. 6 (1930) 168; Bonnal,
op. cit. supra note 95, at 280.
97. By Le Play and others: see in Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 52
et seq.; and in Coulon, op. cit. supra note 94, at 28, 31, 38, 42.
98. Charmont, supra note 96, at 149, 155, 161; Voirin, supra note 96, at
164 et seq.
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rate and in causing a regrettable migration from the rural dis-
tricts to urban centers. 9 It has been argued that the only way for
parents to assure their offspring an adequate provision is to have
one child who inherits the whole estate. And where land holdings
become too small to yield a living, the owners migrate to the
cities altogether.
On the birth-rate question, it has been observed00 that de-
spite alternative movements in both directions population has
maintained a fairly constant level, that while it increased in some
places it decreased in others, and that in the different centers of
population the small rural property owners were more prolific.
While there may be some grain of truth in the original criticism,
this is very exaggerated because it is impossible to find a direct
and exclusive relationship between the parcellation of property
through enforced partition and the allegedly low birth-rate.01
Even if there has been a decrease in the birth-rate at some periods
in certain parts of the country, it is more likely due to selfish
distaste of parental duties or financial inability to maintain and
educate the children. These conditions are, of course, found in
many countries with totally different succession laws and cus-
toms.
Nor is the proof any more convincing that the succession laws
cause the rural exodus. This problem has existed from very early
times and under all sorts of conditions; such displacements are
the normal phenomena of economic evolution whose results are
on the whole satisfactory. 0 2 Furthermore, the emigrants sell out
their holdings so that their places are taken by others. 03 As a
matter of fact, it is often argued that the principle of equal
division has done much to slacken this migration.'0 '
(d) Proposed Reforms. Unfavorable observations and criti-
cism were accompanied by a number of proposed reforms. Some
critics advocated a return to the older system of more general
restrictions, others proclaimed the urgent need for complete testa-
99. Le Play and others: see in Coulon, op. cit. supra note 94, at 11 et
seq., 35; Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 82, 117, 139 et seq.; 3 Colin et
Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 761, no 931.
100. Garrlgou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 121, 128, 130.
101. Boissonade, op. cit. supra note 96, at 650-653; Voirin, supra note 96,
at 170; Garrlgou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 122, 127, 134, 137; 5 Roguin, op. cit.
supra note 94, at 680 et seq.; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at
762, no 931.
102. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 143, 146.
103. Charmont, supra note 96, at 161.
104. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 152.
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mentary freedom.1 5 Of the numerous proposals'0 during the
nineteenth century, very few were of a serious nature.
The one which attracted most attention was made by Le Play
and was given wide circulation by his school of thought about
1865.10? This movement followed a well developed basis of legal
history and philosophy, and it brought into bold relief all the
evil consequences allegedly caused by the existing system. Their
panacea was the elimination of the rdserve and the establishment
of complete liberty of disposition. The ideal was the English free-
dom of willing whose results were all beneficial. This admiring
attitude also extended to the English primogeniture as the best
means of retaining large landed estates.
But it was all to no avail, and despite the number of sup-
porters these attempts were futile.' An extensive Investigation
(Enqufte) throughout the country was made in 1866-there was
no particular desire for a change to testamentary freedom, but
instead there was an almost complete approval of the existing
system of equal division. 10 9
Another seriously supported proposal came from Henri
Coulon in 1899.110 For the proper development of France, he con-
sidered it absolutely necessary to give the people a greater
measure of testamentary freedom. This would assure many de-
sired improvements in the family as well as in commerce and
industry. Coulon followed the Le Play school along their general
lines, but he departed from them in admitting that it was just
and necessary to provide for the maintenance of children and
parents. This concession should not be avaliable to all relatives
in the direct line but only to those who were either minors or
actually in need. Minor children should be assured the mainte-
105. 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 759-761, no 930; 6 Beu-
dant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 180, no 129.
106. Bonnal, op. cit. supra note 95, at 14-15; Garrigou, op. cit. supra note
41, at 55-56, 170-171; Voirin, op. cit. supra note 96, at 165; Coulon, op. cit.
supra note 94; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 28, at 759, no 930.
107. See in Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 51 et seq.; Coulon, op.
cit. supra note 94, at 12; Charmont, supra note 96, at 157; 3 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 760 et seq., no 930 [Le Play: La R~forme Sociale
en France (1864), l'Organisation de la Famille (1868), l'Organisation du Tra-
vail (1870), La Constitution Essentielle de l'Humanit6 (1881)].
108. Le Play's scheme was also severely criticized in its turn. Garrigou,
op. cit. supra note 41, at 53, 83; 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 79, at 857. See
also list of references cited in Voirin, op. cit. supra note 96, at 169.
109. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 55-56. Cf. Bonnal, op. cit. supra
note 95, at 229, 261-271.
110. Coulon, op. cit. supra note 94.
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nance and education which their parents had planned for them;
and it was only human that adult children or ascendants, in need,
should be taken care of. In such cases the major element of ap-
preciation must be left to the court.1 1
In 1904, the centenary of the Civil Code was the occasion of
a great celebration, and also a proper time to ask whether there
should be a revision of the Code. Views were expressed 1.2 in favor
of general or partial revision, and against it, but nothing was ever
done. In the first one hundred years of its existence the Civil
Code had been subjected to an average of about one modification
each year and many of these were of minor significance. 118 As
a body of civil law, the Code has remained intact; aided by legis-
lation and interpretation it has continued to meet the changing
needs by the natural processes of evolution. 1' 4
The specific question of excessive parcellation was answered
by an Investigation in 19091 5 which showed that many parts of
the country avoided an increase in the number of small proper-
ties by the customary practices to prevent partition.
As recently as 1928, a recommendation was made before the
Society of Legislative Studies"' that the text of the law should
be reformed to correspond to its spirit, and that children who
renounce or are unworthy should not be counted in calculating
the rdserve. In such event, the cumulation should be in favor of
the disposable portion. While the anomaly in the actual appli-
cation 1l? of the principle was generally conceded, even by the
111. Id. at 29, 42-43, 53, 68-69. It is doubtful whether Coulon could have
been posted on the debates which were at that very time taking place in
the legislature of New Zealand, and it is remarkable how close his unsuc-
cessful project was to the solution later adopted by a number of common
law countries. See Dainow, supra note 1.
112. Josserand, La Propri6t6 Collective, Le Code Civil Livre du Centenalre
(1904) 357; Larnaude, La N~cessit6 de Revision, id. at 901; Pilon, R~forme
par vole de R6vision G6n6rale, id. at 933; Planiol, Inutilit6 d'une R6vision
G~nrale du Code Civil, id. at 955; Gaudemet, Codifications R~centes, et la
R6vision du Code Civil (translated in 11 Continental Legal History Series,
pp. 286-307); id. at 965. Cf. Josserand, Evolutions et Actualit~s (1936) 26 et
seq.
118. Since 1904, this average has been much higher as a result of the
acceleration in commercial and industrial progress. 1 Aubry et Rau, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 45 et seq., § 13; Lobingier, supra note 48, at 130.
114. Cf. Colin, supra note 14, at 325; Josserand, La Propri~t6 Collective,
Le Code Civil Livre du Centenaire, 357; Josserand, Evolutions et Actualit~s,
27-28.
115. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 71-72.
116. 24 Bulletin de la Socit6 d'Etudes L~gislatives (1928) 87, 94, 272,
ques. 69.
117. See text supported by note 83.
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courts, it seemed doubtful whether such a change would be ju-
dicious. Tampering independently with one detail of a complex
system might destroy the harmony between the underlying princi-
ples. It is noteworthy that while many questions frequently recur
in the discussions of the Society, this particular issue has never
reappeared.
From these few indications, and from the fact that many
other causes have also contributed to the parcellation of land,118
which existed long before the Civil Code,1" 9 it is manifest that one
cannot find an exclusive relationship between the succession laws
of restricted disposition and any specific social or economic conse-
quences of the kind examined.12 In each instance, a favorable or
unfavorable position can be incorrectly rationalized from factual
observations; and neither one can be convincing. In the natural
sciences, a single cause and its effect can be isolated, but this is
not often possible for the relation of a legal problem to social and
economic consequences. 1 2
Apart from historical analysis and general development, a
rational and useful conclusion to be drawn from this kind of
an inquiry is that the only way to construct or to analyze such
a scheme of succession laws is on the basis of fundamental prin-
ciples. And it may be that this institution of forced heirship in
French law 12 2 has withstood all attempts at reformation because
it was arrived at as the compromise of the two basic doctrines
which have not and cannot be changed: the right of ownership
and the duty of maintenance.
118. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 97; Bonnal, op. cit. supra note
95, at 230 et seq.
119. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 82, 89; Bonnal, op. cit. supra note
95, at 326.
120. Garrigou, op. cit. supra note 41, at 167; Voirin, supra note 96, at 170;
5 Roguin, op. cit. supra note 94, at 664 et seq., 675, 694. Cf. Vallier, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 582-583.
121. Cf. Charmont, supra note 96, at 156.
122. Recent reports show that about four-fifths of the successions in
France go by intestacy. Amos and Walton, op. cit. supra note 82, at 338; 6
Beudant, op. cit. supra note 13, at 187, no 133. From this it must follow that
either the people are too disgusted with the insignificance of the disposable
portion to make use of it, or that not being especially interested in testa-
mentary disposition they are well content with the existing laws and prefer
to let the general rules of Intestate succession apply to the entire estate.
The latter conclusion would certainly seem to be the justifiable and correct
one. The repeated failures of all attempts to reform the limitations on
gratuitous disposition corroborate the conclusion that the French people are
well satisfied with their institutions.
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